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NOTES
"ingenuity in calculation" and "form of words," is constitutional;
it does not impose a tax on exempt interest because (1) the policy-
holders' share goes to the reserve and is not taxed and (2) the com-
pany is allowed a deduction for its pro rata share.
Michael M. Boone
Williams v. McKnight: The Constitutionality of
Section 46 of The Probate Code
I. COMMUNITY PROPERTY SURVIVORSHip AGREEMENTS
BEFORE HILLEY v. HILLEY
The legality of joint tenancies involving community property has
long been a problem in Texas. Joint tenants constitute one tenant
and have one estate in the land. In the ancient language of the com-
mon law, each joint tenant is said to hold "per my et per tout";
that is, each tenant is the tenant of the whole estate for purposes of
tenure and survivorship, but for purposes of alienation he has only
his undivided share.'
The distinctive characteristic of the joint tenancy is the right of
survivorship; upon the death of one of the tenants, the remaining
tenant has the whole estate. The interest of the deceased tenant does
not actually pass to the surviving tenants when the first tenant dies.
Instead, because the joint tenants were owners of the whole, or
owners "per tout," the title to the estate of the deceased owner
simply ceases to exist.
As a result of this survivorship characteristic, parties holding
property under a joint tenancy receive several advantages. First, the
surviving owner obtains the interest of the deceased owner without
being required to pay a Texas inheritance tax.4 Second, since the
entire estate is automatically that of the survivor, the need for an
administrator or a probate proceeding is eliminated.
At common law, when land was conveyed to two or more persons,
'2 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 418 (3rd ed. 1939).
Sid. § 419.
aTex. Att'y Gen. Op., WW - 262, Sept. 25, 1957.
This principle was announced by the Texas attorney general in an opinion involving a
tract of land held by three daughters as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The first
daughter died, and the remaining two became the sole owners of the land. The attorney
general held that no inheritance tax was due upon the interest owned by the deceased
tenant, because no taxable estate passed to the surviving sisters.
4 See note 3 supra.
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a presumption arose that the land was acquired in joint tenancy
with right of survivorship. The Texas Legislature, in defining the
law of succession in 1840, passed a statute' with the purpose of
abolishing joint tenancies with right of survivorship. This statute
6
was incorporated into article 2580 of the revised Texas statutes,
which later became section 46 of the Probate Code.' Article 2580
was interpreted in 1939 in Chandler v. Kountzes as abolishing joint
tenancies where they would have been created by law, but permitting
their creation by contract, will, or deed of conveyance. Consequently,
section 46 of the Probate Code was amended in 1955' to allow joint
owners to form, by written agreement, a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship.
The question that now faced the courts was whether a husband
and wife could hold community property under a joint tenancy
without violating the Texas constitution and statutory enactments.
Article XVI, section 15 of the Texas constitution e and articles
4614" and 461312 of the Revised Texas Statutes define separate prop-
erty as that owned or claimed by each spouse before marriage and
that acquired after marriage by gift, devise, or descent. All other
property is defined by article 4619" as belonging to the community.
The courts were confronted, therefore, with an important decision
-was a joint tenancy agreement, which changed the community
property of the two spouses into the separate property of the sur-
' Texas Acts 1840, ch. -, § 17, 2 Gammel, Laws of Texas 306, 309 (1898).
6Former art. 2580, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) provided:
Where two or more persons hold an estate, real, personal, or mixed, jointly,
and one joint owner dies before severance, his interest in said joint estate shall
not survive to the remaining joint owner or joint owners, but shall descend
to, and be vested in, the heirs or legal representatives of such deceased joint
owner in the same manner as if his interest had been severed and ascertained.
'Texas Prob. Code Ann., § 46 (1956).
'In Chandler v. Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref., the
court decided that:
While the wording of Article 2580 indicates a legislative intent to abolish
the relationship of joint tenancy where it would otherwise have been created
by law, including the common law doctrine of survivorship, there is nothing
in the subject matter of the act which would, in our opinion, justify the
presumption that the legislature intended to thereby prevent the parties to a
contract, a will, or a deed of conveyance, from providing among themselves
that the property in question should pass to and vest in the survivor as at
common law.
' Section 46 of the Probate Code had incorporated the language of former article 2580.
To this was added: "Provided, however, that by an agreement in writing of joint owners of
property, the interest of any joint owner who dies may be made to survive to the surviving
joint owner or joint owners, but no such agreement shall be inferred from the mere fact
that the property is held in joint ownership." Texas Acts 1955, ch. 55, at 88.
'lTex. Const. art. 16, § 15 (1876).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4614 (1957).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4613 (1929).
13Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1959).
vivor, violative of the above constitutional and statutory definitions?
This problem has been before the courts on several occasions.
14
In Shroff v. Deaton," a husband and wife purchased shares in a
savings and loan association with community property and executed
a written agreement providing for a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship. The husband died and the court, relying on Chandler
v. Kountze, " awarded the shares to the wife as her separate property.
However, in reaching this decision, the court did not rely entirely
on the survivorship agreement, but also upon the fact that the hus-
band made a gift of his share to his wife shortly before his death.
Several years later, in Reed v. Reed," a survivorship agreement
between husband and wife was held invalid for two reasons. First,
the agreement was not a "partition" of community property into
separate property because the constitutional and statutory require-
ments were not met.18 Secondly, the agreement violated article 4610,1,
which prohibits agreements between husband and wife that have
the effect of altering the legal order of descent.
Three years after the Reed decision the Texas Supreme Court de-
cided Ricks v. Smith,"° which involved the purchase by the husband
of United States Savings Bonds with community funds. The bonds
were purchased under United States Treasury regulations, which
provide that if either owner dies without having presented the bond
for payment, the survivor will be the sole owner. The agreement
"Adams v. Jones, 258 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), is omitted from this dis-
cussion because it did not deal with community property.
15220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
'6 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref. It should be pointed out that the
Chandler case did not deal with community property.
17283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
'" Article XVI, section 15 of the Texas constitution defines the separate property of the
wife as being that "owned or claimed by her before marriage and that acquired afterward by
gift, devise, or descent." This section was amended in 1948 to permit the partition of com-
munity property. The amendment provided that:
[A] husband and wife, without prejudice to pre-existing creditors, may
from time to time by written instrument as if the wife were a femme sole
partition between themselves in severalty or into equal undivided interests all
or any part of their existing community property, or exchange between them-
selves the community interest of one spouse in any property for the com-
munity interest of the other spouse in other community property, whereupon
the portion or interest set aside to each spouse shall be and constitute a part
of the separate property of such spouse.
This amendment is self-operative, but laws may be passed prescribing re-
quirements as to the form and manner of execution of such instruments and
providing for their recordation ...
Article 4624a was passed to implement this constitutional amendment. It provides that
the partition or exchange "shall be effectuated by written instrument subscribed and
acknowledged by both spouses in the manner now required by law for the conveyance of
realty ... "
'" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1925).
20159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958).
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was upheld on two theories: (1) the supremacy of the federal regula-
tions and (2) a third party beneficiary contract between the govern-
ment and the husband for the benefit of the surviving wife.
II. HILLEY v. HILLEY AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
Hilley v. Hilley5' came before the Texas Supreme Court in 1961.
In that case a husband and wife purchased stock with community
funds, and the certificates were issued in the names of the husband
and wife as "joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common." The court held that a husband and wife can-
not purchase property with community funds and have it trans-
ferred to them as joint tenants with right of survivorship. In reach-
ing this result, the supreme court used four steps in its reasoning.
First, the court distinguished the previous cases which had held sur-
vivorship agreements valid. Adams v. Jones"5 and Chandler were held
inapplicable because they did not involve community property or
a survivorship agreement between husband and wife. Shroff v. Deaton
was discounted because of the finding that a short time before his
death the husband made a gift of his interest to his wife." After
distinguishing those cases, the court also mentioned Reed v. Reed,
in which the survivorship agreement was held invalid."
The second part of the opinion dealt with the methods by which
a person can acquire separate property in Texas. The court stated
that under the Texas constitution and statutes, property can only
be separate if acquired before marriage, or after marriage by gift,
devise, or descent. However, two exceptions were pointed out.'
21 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
22258 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
23 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
24 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
2z Additional cases present variations from the basic methods of acquiring separate prop-
erty as set forth by the supreme court in Hilley. These include:
a. Mutation or changes in form, including:
(1) exchanges, which follow the rule as to purchases, Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6
(1851);
(2) increase in value, Stringfellow v. Sorrells, 82 Tex. 277, 18 S.W. 689 (1890);
(3) sale of:
(a) royalties, Texas Company v. Parks, 247 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952);
(b) bonuses, Welder v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 583 (5th Cir, 1945). See also
Jackson, Community Property and Federal Taxes, 12 Sw. L.J. 1, 10 (1958), and notes 35
and 36 and accompanying text.
b. Declaration of stock dividends out of income of separate corporate ownership, Scofield
v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942).
c. Separation agreement pending divorce, Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324
(1890).
d. Failure to trace community property into separate property, Burton v. Bell, 380
S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964).
(Continued on next page)
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Property purchased with separate funds is separate property," and
community property becomes separate if partitioned in the manner
provided in articles 4624a"7 and 88 la-2 3." Justice Walker, who wrote
the court's opinion, analyzed the facts in Hilley to see if the stock
became the wife's separate property by any of the above methods,
and concluded that it did not. The stock certificates were not
acquired by devise or descent; neither were they purchased with
separate funds. The husband made no gift of his interest to his wife2
because the spouses purported to form a contract."0 The only remain-
ing possibility was that the property became the wife's separate
property as the result of a partition under article XVI, section 15
of the Texas constitution. Justice Walker ruled this out because
the survivorship agreement was not subscribed and acknowledged by
both spouses as required in article 4624a. Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the marital partners had failed to use a method which
would, under the Texas constitution and statutes, make the stock the
separate property of the wife.31
The third step taken by the supreme court in deciding Hilley was
to overrule the case of Ricks v. Smith." The court said that the
contract which the purchaser of a United States Savings Bond there
e. Purchase of land, and deed recital is in favor of wife, Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex.
593, 254 S.W.2d 777 (1952).
f. Purchase of United States securities with right of survivorship, Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663 (1962).
g. Purchase of United States insurance, Wisner v. Wisner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
"6 Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1 851).
27 See note 18 supra.
2Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 881a-23 was repealed in 1963 and replaced by article
852a, § 6.09, which provides:
A husband and wife shall have full power to enter into a savings contract
involving a savings account consisting of funds which are community property
of their marriage so as to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
as to such account and any future additions or dividends made or credited
thereto and, to the extent necessary to accomplish such result in law, such
contract shall constitute a partition of such community property or reciprocal
gifts from the respective spouses, if the same is in writing and subscribed to
by such husband and wife even though not acknowledged by either of them.
'If the wife had died first, a question might have been raised as to her donative
capacity to deal with her interest in the community estate. See the observation on Stratton
v. Robinson in McKnight, Liability of Separate and Community Property for Obligations
of Spouses to Strangers, Creditors' Rights in Texas 353, n.127 (1963).
"' Justice Walker reasoned that the husband and wife purported to enter into a contract,
under the terms of which each surrendered a community interest in exchange for the right
of a joint tenant. The right acquired by the husband is no less valuable than that received
by the wife; neither is his detriment greater than that suffered by the wife. Thus, there
could be no gift because the right or interest which each spouse expected to acquire was
bought with a valuable consideration.
"lAs pointed out in Kellet v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 169, 66 S.W. 51, 54 (1902), "the
question whether particular property is separate or community must depend upon the ex-
istence or non-existence of the facts, which, by the rules of law, give character to it, and
not merely upon the stipulations of the parties that it shall belong to one class or the other."
82 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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made with the government for the benefit of a third person is
nothing more than a survivorship agreement' and, therefore, it must
meet the requirements of section 46 of the Probate Code. Section 46,
as it then read, provided that the interest of a joint owner could be
made to survive only by agreement of the joint owners in writing.
Since the contract in Ricks was made between the husband and the
government, and not between the husband and wife, it was invalid.
The court also pointed out that federal regulations do not override
our local laws in matters of purely private ownership where the in-
terests of the United States are not involved.'
Finally, the court stated that the Texas constitution and statutes
already provide a three-step method whereby a husband and wife
may arrange for community property to vest in the survivor. 5 First,
property may be partitioned in the manner provided in article 4624a,
the portion set aside to each spouse becoming his or her separate
property. Next, under article 4614, the wife can obtain manage-
ment, control, and disposition of her separate estate."0 The husband
and wife can then enter into an effective survivorship agreement
covering the property separately owned by either or both.
The decision in Hilley was interpreted as establishing the rule that
a husband and wife in Texas cannot form a survivorship agreement
with respect to community property. However, immediately follow-
ing the Hilley case, the fifty-seventh legislature adopted House Bill
670,'7 which added to section 46 of the Probate Code the following
sentence: "It is specifically provided that any husband and his wife
may, by written agreement, create a joint estate out of their com-
munity property with rights of survivorship." This amendment took
effect on May 15, 1961, and if constitutional, supersedes the holding
in Hilley.
Recent cases have dealt with survivorship agreements, but none
have directly ruled on the constitutionality of the new amendment.
The first such case was Free v. Bland,"s in which the United States
'3 Hilley v. Hilley, 342 S.W.2d at 570.
34 Ibid.
3 11d. at 571.
'This second step is no longer necessary since the wife's power to control separate
property is now the same as the husband's by operation of law.
a"Texas Acts 1961, ch. 120.
38 369 U.S. 663 (1962). The facts in Free v. Bland were the same as those in the Ricks
case-a husband in Texas purchased United States Savings Bonds with community property.
The bonds were issued to "husband and wife," and according to the Treasury regulations,
the survivor was to be recognized as the sole owner. The United States Supreme Court
upheld the survivorship provision because it was based on a federal law, and under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, a federal law must prevail if it conflicts
with a state law. See Comment, Community Property-Force and Effect of Treasury Regu-




Supreme Court decided that United States Savings Bonds, held by
the purchaser under Treasury regulations creating a right of sur-
vivorship, pass to the survivor as his separate property. This decision
reinstated the holding of Ricks v. Smith,"' which had been overruled
in Hilley. Section 46 of the Probate Code was not mentioned in the
opinion.
Some time after the effective date of the amendment to section 46,
the Texas Supreme Court decided Davis v. East Texas Savings and
Loan Association."° In that case a husband and wife using commu-
nity funds purchased a savings and loan certificate with a survivor-
ship provision.' The court failed to uphold the agreement, basing
its decision entirely on Hilley. Section 46 was not mentioned since
the purchase of the certificate and the death of the husband both
occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment."
III. WILLIAMS V. McKNIGHT
The first and only case to rule directly upon the constitutionality
of section 46 of the Probate Code, as amended in 1961, is the recent
case of Williams v. McKnight." In that case a husband and wife de-
posited $10,000 in each of two banks and $10,000 in a savings and
loan association. Each of the three accounts was subject to a written
survivorship agreement signed by both spouses. After the husband's
death, the wife claimed the funds as her separate property, relying
on the 1961 amendment to section 46. She was opposed by her hus-
band's executor, who maintained that the funds were community
property. Relying on the holding in Hilley, he contended that a
survivorship agreement formed according to the Probate Code
amendment violates article XVI, section 15 of the Texas constitu-
tion. The court relied on the Probate Code amendment" to uphold
39See text accompanying note 20 supra.
40163 Tex. 361, 354 S.W.2d 926 (1962).
41 In the Davis case, the husband also purchased a savings and loan certificate with his
separate funds, and the certificate stated that it was held by husband and wife as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. The court, in upholding this agreement, stated: "We
know of no constitutional or statutory impediment to the making by a husband of such
a contract affecting title to his separate funds." 354 S.W.2d at 931.
" The same situation existed in Brunson v. Brunson, 372 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963), where the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals also found it unnecessary to rule on the
constitutionality of the 1961 amendment since the husband died two days before it went
into effect.
43391 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1965).
"It is puzzling why, throughout its opinion, the court regarded section 46 as the only
statute applicable to the three accounts. One of the accounts was with a savings and loan
association, and normally should be covered by former article 88la-23, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
(1929) (now art. 852a-6.09). Presumably the specific requirements of article 881a-23 were
not met by the parties, and as a result, the court had to resort to the general provisions of
section 46 of the Probate Code.
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the survivorship agreement and awarded the funds to the wife as
her separate property. It also expressly ruled that section 46 of the
Probate Code, as amended in 1961, is constitutional.
The reasoning used by the court was quite simple. Article XVI,
section 15 of the Texas constitution defines the separate property
of the wife. It was amended in 1948 to permit a husband and wife to
partition their community property into the separate property of
each if done by a written instrument.' The second paragraph of the
1948 amendment states that the amendment is self-operative, but
laws may be passed prescribing requirements as to the form and
manner of execution of such instruments. As a result of this language,
the Legislature enacted article 4624a,6 which requires that partitions
be in writing, subscribed and acknowledged. Article 881a-23 was
amended in 1957 4 to permit the partition of community property
invested in savings and loan shares if done by written instrument.
In 1961, the amendment to section 46 was also passed. The Eastland
court, realizing that two statutes already provided partition require-
ments, simply held that the 1961 enactment is another law prescrib-
ing requirements as to the form and manner of written partition
instruments as contemplated by the 1948 constitutional amendment.
IV. CONCLIJuONS
The holding by the Eastland court that section 46 of the Probate
Code provides another method for executing partition instruments
is logically correct. The language of the 1948 constitutional amend-
ment indicates that the vital requirement of partition agreements is
that they be in writing. Both articles 4624a and 88la-23 (now
852a-6.09) meet this requirement. The 1961 Probate Code amend-
ment also meets this standard since it requires that the husband and
wife enter into a written agreement. It is reasonable to assume that
the Legislature intended section 46 to be another law providing a
method by which marital partners can partition their community
property."
45 See note 18 supra.
o Ibid.
4 The following provision was added to Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 881a-23 in 1957:
Joint shares or share accounts issued in the name of a husband and wife
may constitute a partition between them of any community funds invested in
such shares or share accounts under the provisions of Article XVI, Section 15
of the Constitution of this State if the parties so provide by executing a writ-
ten instrument and acknowledge the same in the manner now required by
law for the conveyance of realty.4SThe 1948 constitutional amendment allowing partition provided that "laws may be
passed prescribing, requirements as to form and manner of execution of such instruments.
." Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15 (1876).
For other suggestions as to the Legislature's intent in passing the amendment to section
[Vol. 19
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Of the two methods of partition which existed prior to the passage
of the 1961 amendment one is restricted in application and the other
is of general application but very strict in its requirements. Article
881a-23 ordinarily applied only to partitions of savings and loan
accounts. The other method, partition under article 4624a, requires
the written instrument to be subscribed and acknowledged, and the
Supreme Court expressly stated in Hilley that any survivorship agree-
ment that does not meet either of these requirements will be held in-
valid. Therefore, the immediate passage of the Probate Code amend-
ment following the decision in Hilley indicates that the legislature
wanted to provide a simpler method for partition than that allowed
by article 4624a.
It should be noted here that the Legislature, in its haste49 to re-
spond to the Hilley decision, failed to word the amendment to section
46 in the terms of the 1948 constitutional amendment. Another
sentence should have been added to section 46 to provide that any
joint tenancy agreement formed under this amendment will consti-
tute a partition under the Texas constitution. Such language would
have prevented the confusion which has resulted from the passage
of the amendment. However, the parties in Williams should not be
penalized for the legislature's careless draftingY
Once it is seen that the 1961 Probate Code amendment is another
law prescribing a method for partitioning community property, the
question arises as to whether such a survivorship agreement actually
constitutes a partition as contemplated by the 1948 constitutional
amendment. The executor of the deceased husband raised this ques-
tion by contending that a partition under the constitution is a
present division of property with a vesting of the separate interest
immediately upon execution of the partition agreement, whereas
property held under a joint tenancy agreement as allowed by the
46 of the Probate Code, see: Jackson, Community Property and Rights of Survivorship
(After Hilley v. Hilley and H. B. 670), 13 Baylor L. Rev. 139, 146 (1961). See also
Comment, Hailey, Hilley, and House Bill 670-A Study in Partition and Survivorship in
Texas Community Property, 15 Sw. L.J. 613, 622 (1961).
" The haste with which the Legislature acted is apparent when one realizes that the
Hilley decision appeared in the Texas Supreme Court Journal on Jan. 25, 1961, and the
Probate Code amendment containing an effective emergency clause became law on May 15,
1961.11 The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be,
and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recog-
nized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute,
the change of policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms,
but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what
you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as
before.
Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (Ist Cir. 1908).
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Probate Code amendment does not vest in the wife as her separate
estate until the death of the husband.
The executor's contention is incorrect and could have been an-
swered by the Eastland court. As previously stated, for the purpose
of survivorship each joint tenant is the tenant of the whole estate.
When one of the joint owners dies, his interest does not actually
pass to the survivor; the interest of the deceased merely ceases to
exist." Nothing passes to the survivor at that time because he was
already an owner of the whole estate. From the foregoing it is appar-
ent that when the husband and wife execute the written joint ten-
ancy agreement, there results at that every instant a partition of the
community property into the separate property of each and the con-
version of those separate interests into a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship in the surviving spouse. In other words, the separate
property vests immediately upon making the written agreement, and
each spouse obtains ownership of the whole estate. It does not vest,
as the husband's executor contended, upon the death of one of the
spouses.
Therefore, the constitutionality of section 46 of the Probate Code
needs to be upheld for three reasons. First, section 46 is constitutional
since it is merely another law providing for the execution of parti-
tion instruments as contemplated by the 1948 constitutional amend-
ment. Secondly, it furnishes a husband and wife with a simple, easy
method of partition and eliminates the necessity of meeting the strict
requirements of article 4624a. Thirdly, the supreme court's interpre-
tation of section 46 may affect the interpretation of other statutes.
A recent statute 2 was passed by the legislature allowing a husband
and wife to hold title to their automobile under a joint tenancy
agreement. The court's decision as to section 46 may affect the consti-
tutionality of this title statute as well as the current savings and loan
statute. 3 Thus, the Williams case presents the supreme court with an
opportunity to clear up the confusion which has long surrounded
section 46 of the Probate Code.
Joseph J. McCain, Jr.
" See text accompanying note 3 supra.
" Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 658, § 24, at 1514 (1965), provides that an
automobile title certificate must now contain:
A statement indicating "rights of survivorship" when an agreement pro-
viding that the motor vehicle is to be held between a husband and his wife
jointly with the interest of either spouse who dies to survive to the surviving
spouse is surrendered with the application for certificate of title. This agree-
ment is valid only if signed by both husband and wife and, if signed, the
certificate shall be issued in the name of both.
53 See note 28 supra.
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